Subjective educational mismatch and signalling in Spain

• Autores: María Inmaculada García Mainar, Víctor Manuel Montuenga Gómez
• Localización: Documentos de trabajo ( Universidad de Zaragoza. Facultad de Economía y Empresa ), ISSN-e 2171-6668, Nº. 3, 2017
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Over-education may arise from the voluntary decisions of individuals to acquire more qualifications than those required in the workplace. In these cases, the mismatch may have a signalling role that allows workers to compensate for the lack of certain other skills, or to gain access to the labour market. The aim of this paper is to analyse the signalling role of over-education in Spain, a country characterised by a stronglysegmented labour market with high unemployment levels, and a large number of overeducated individuals. Using micro data for a representative sample of Spanish workers, we use three different methods to test the signalling value of over-education. The results obtained provide evidence that educational mismatch plays a clear signalling role.