El 11 de junio de 1917, Eduardo Dato encabezaba su segundo proyecto de gobierno al frente de los conservadores. Tras de sí, dejaba relevantes episodios políticos como la escisión maurista en 1913, al hacerse cargo del poder en contra de su jefe de filas. Dato, presidente del Consejo hasta 1915, había sido también el artífice de la, en ocasiones, difícil neutralidad de España durante la I Guerra Mundial. Así mismo, llegado 1917, sustituyendo en el Gobierno, a instancias del rey, a García Prieto, hubo de hacer frente a la concurrencia de tres conflictos de distinta naturaleza: Por una parte, el pulso con las beligerantes Juntas de Defensa, movilizadas para reclamar una política de regeneración del Ejército; Por otra parte, la celebración de la Asamblea de Parlamentarios celebrada en Barcelona, en julio, y liderada por Cambó, exigiendo una mayor representatividad, por parte del régimen, de las identidades regionales; por último, en agosto hubo de gestionar una huelga revolucionaria, que acabaría por derribarlo del poder y sumiría al régimen monárquico en una crisis sin precedentes.
El objeto de análisis de este trabajo es, precisamente, la gestión que Dato y Sánchez Guerra, ministro de Gobernación, realizaron de la huelga revolucionaria de agosto de 1917
On June 11, 1917, Eduardo Dato formed his second government as Prime Minister of Spain and Leader of the Conservative party. In this position, he abandoned the current political process, resulting in the Maurist schism, as Dato assumed power from the former Premier, Maura, who had refused to convene his government. Dato, Prime Minister until 1915, was also the architect of the problematic neutrality of Spain during the First World War. Assuming power in 1917, and replacing the ruling government at the request of King García Prieto, Dato had to face three concurrent conflicts of different natures: On the one hand, he strongly supported the belligerent Department of Defense and agreed to their demand to implement a policy of Army regeneration and remobilization; on the other hand, Dato had to face the celebration of the Assembly of Parliamentarians held in Barcelona, in July, and led by Cambó, who were demanding greater representation of regional identities from the National regime; finally, in August he had to manage a revolutionary strike, which would eventually topple him from power and plunge the monarchist regime into an unprecedented crisis.
The objective of this work is to precisely analyze the management of the Revolutionary Strike of August 1917 by Dato and Sánchez Guerra, Minister of the Interior
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