A justificação ética para o Rendimento Incondicional à luz da teoria rawlsiana de justiça e algumas considerações empíricas
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[1] Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Socorro, Portugal
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- Localización: Revista portuguesa de filosofía, ISSN 0870-5283, Vol. 74, Fasc. 2-3, 2018 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Gestão e Filosofia), págs. 661-694
- Idioma: portugués
- Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
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Resumen
In order to discuss Unconditional Basic Income from a philosophical standpoint, it is important to mention John Rawls and its concept of justice as fairness and property-owning democracy. At the same time, one is required to argue whether Rawls’ ideas are compatible with the UBI concept. On one hand, the idea of social minimum and ensuring everyone its fair share might lead to a strong and simple justification of UBI through John Rawls’ lens. On the other hand, I believe it may be too simplistic, since reciprocity is embedded in John Rawls’ principles of justice and one of his models of a fair society: property-owning democracy. I will argue in favor of the latter position: that it is not possible to justify an UBI through John Rawl’s theory. The discussion will then move into looking at our own societies, considering empirical issues in the analysis (such as poverty and inequality), since UBI can be an innovative measure to tackle some of these challenges.
