Corporate Lobbying on Accounting Standards: Methods, Timing and Perceived Effectiveness.

• Autores: George Georgiou
• Localización: Abacus: A journal of accounting, finance and business studies, ISSN 0001-3072, Vol. 40, Nº 2, 2004, págs. 219-237
• Idioma: inglés
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• Dialnet Métricas: 3 Citas
• Resumen

  • There is a long-standing concern in the literature about the potential importance of non-observable forms of lobbying that may be used by corporate managers to influence accounting standard setting bodies. To date, however, no study has documented their nature or their volume. This study provides such evidence in the context of the U.K.'s Accounting Standards Board (ASB) standard setting process for the period 1991–96. It also provides evidence with respect to the timing at which lobbying activity takes place and its perceived effectiveness by corporate managers. The findings suggest that companies use a variety of lobbying methods, including appeals to their auditors and private meetings with ASB members and staff. Importantly, however, the use of these methods is significantly associated with the use of comment letters; companies which submit comment letters are much more likely to use other methods than companies which do not. Other findings suggest that more companies lobby during the stages of the ASB process at which public consultation takes place (e.g., exposure period of a discussion paper) than at the earlier stages of the process (e.g., agenda formation) which are considered in the literature as the stages at which lobbying can be most effective. With respect to the perceived effectiveness of lobbying, companies which lobbied the ASB considered lobbying to be more effective than companies which did not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]