How ius (right) became distinguished from lex (law): Two early episodes in the story
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White, M.J. [1]
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[1] Arizona State University
Arizona State University
Estados Unidos
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- Localización: History of political thought, ISSN 0143-781X, Vol. 40, Nº 4, 2019, págs. 583-606
- Idioma: inglés
- Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
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Resumen
This essay examines two early episodes in the long and complex history of the development of distinctions between two Latin nouns, 'ius' and 'lex', the primary meaning of both of which was originally 'law'. The first episode is the development of a distinction between a legal usage of the Roman Jurists and a philosophical usage extending from Cicero. According to the former usage, 'ius' is the more theoretically fundamental (and general) term; according to the latter usage, it is lex that undergirds ius. The second episode considered in the essay is the reconciliation of these two usages by Thomas Acquinas, who follows Cicero in theoretically privileging 'lex', while officially limiting the signification of 'ius' by identifying it with 'iustum' (what is just). The essay concludes with consideration of post-Aquinian developments that eventually led to Thomas Hobbes's claim that lex (law) and ius (right) are antithetical.
