The Epistemological Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism and Its Unavoidable Slide into Compatibilism

• Dal Monte, Daniel Dal Monte ^[1]
  1. [1] Temple University

     Temple University

     City of Philadelphia, Estados Unidos

     
• Localización: Revista de Estudios Kantianos: Publicación internacional de la Sociedad de Estudios Kantianos en Lengua Española, ISSN-e 2445-0669, Vol. 4, Nº. 2, 2019 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Revista de Estudios Kantianos), págs. 476-507
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • This paper consists in two major parts. In the first part, I explain and defend Kant’s explicit rejection of compatibilist theories of freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason. I do this by a careful analysis of some contemporary compatibilist theories. In the second major part, I explain how the epistemological interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism inevitably degenerates into a compatibilist version of freedom. The upshot will be that epistemological interpretations of transcendental idealism are not viable because of their connection with compatibilism, which Kant rejected.