Se examina la teoría de la constitución denominada la lectura moral, de Dworkin. Esta teoría tiene particular interés porque conecta con una concepción del derecho que ha contribuido a generar y/o revitalizar debates nucleares iusteóricos y porque presenta conexiones con temas centrales de la teoría del Estado constitucional. Según la tesis central de la teoría de la constitución del mencionado autor, cuando un juez se enfrenta a un caso que requiere interpretar contenidos de la constitución, es inevitable incurrir en juicios de valor políticos y morales.
The theory of the constitution called “the moral reading” by Dworkin is here under consideration. This theory is of particular interest since it is connected to a conception of law which helped to generate nuclear debates in legal theory, and since it has connections to some central issues of the theory of the constitutional state. At the core of Dworkin’s theory of the constitution is his tenet according to which when a judge is faced with a case which requires to interpret some part of the constitution, it is inevitable getting involved in moral and political judgments.
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