The asymmetries of pouvoir constituant mixte

• Autores: Vlad Perju
• Localización: European Law Journal, ISSN-e 1468-0386, Vol. 25, Nº. 5, 2019, págs. 515-520
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This invited Symposium contribution discusses Jürgen Habermas's celebrated and influential theory of pouvoir constituant mixte. In that account, the EU is constituted by a double authority: that of citizens of nation‐states and that of (the same) citizens as subjects of the future EU. I argue that Habermas's theory is convincing only if the two constitution‐building subjects—citizens of the already constituted nation‐states and citizens of the to‐be‐constituted European Union—are positioned symmetrically in relation to each other. I argue that Habermas's construction is, in fact, asymmetrical. I identify three asymmetries: of expectations, of function and of origins. I argue that these asymmetries place the role of citizens as members of nation‐states in such an advantageous position that it would be irrational for citizens in their other capacity, as citizens of the to‐be‐constituted European Union, to participate in the constituent authority in the terms proposed and defended by Habermas