Adjusting legal standards.

• Lavie, Shay ^[1] ; Ganor, Tal ^[2] ; Feldman, Yuval ^[3]
  1. [1] Tel Aviv University

     Tel Aviv University

     Israel

     
  2. [2] Hebrew University of Jerusalem

     Hebrew University of Jerusalem

     Israel

     
  3. [3] Bar-Ilan University

     Bar-Ilan University

     Israel

     

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• Localización: European journal of law and economics, ISSN 0929-1261, Vol. 49, Nº 1, 2020, págs. 33-53
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • This paper seeks to explore whether the interpretation of legal standards is influenced by decision-makers' substantive decision. Prior literature on motivated reasoning has shown that decision-makers "shift" their perception of evidence in their desired direction. To the extent this logic applies to legal-standards, we should expect decision-makers to adjust the perception of the legal standard accordingly—e.g., one's decision to favor the plaintiff would induce a pro-plaintiff interpretation of the required threshold to win a case. We present the results of two experiments in which we asked subjects to report their interpretation of the applicable legal threshold after deciding a case, under different legal thresholds. Our participants, by and large, did not shift the legal standard to conform to their substantive decision, contrary to the theoretical expectations. We thus conclude that decision-makers treat the legal standard distinctly than regular evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]