Ethics beyond Computation: Why We Can't (and Shouldn't) Replace Human Moral Judgment with Algorithms

• Autores: William Hasselberger
• Localización: Social research: An international quarterly of the social sciences, ISSN 0037-783X, Nº. 4, 2019 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Persons without Qualities: Algorithms, AI, and the Reshaping of Ourselves), págs. 977-999
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • “Morality algorithms” (e.g., the “death algorithm” of self-driving cars) are part of an effort to codify moral norms in algorithms. They raise two questions. First, can algorithms capture the structure of moral reasoning and ethical judgment? From an Aristotelean perspective, many “inputs” to moral deliberation are simply not quantifiable, including relevant features of a situation, the context, and the proper criterion of moral judgment. Second, should we rely on algorithmic decision-aids? Exploring the “outputs” reveals the crucial difference between performing an activity either formulaically or the basis of understanding what is good, worthwhile, or justified. Reflection on these questions reveals a practical, and not merely philosophical, problem with “morality algorithms.”