Does a “soft” board gender quotas policy work?

• José Ignacio Conde-Ruiz ^[1] ; Manu García ^[1] ; Manuel Yáñez ^[2]
  1. [1] Universidad Complutense de Madrid

     Universidad Complutense de Madrid

     Madrid, España

     
  2. [2] Fundacion de Estudios de Economía Aplicada, Madrid, Spain
• Localización: Applied economic analysis, ISSN 2632-7627, Vol. 28, Nº. 82, 2020, págs. 46-68
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo
• Resumen

  • Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze the functioning of a non-sanction “soft” gender quota policy structure (a simple recommendation), using the case of Spain. In the first part of the paper, the authors have reported the dismal improvement regarding the increase of female percentage presence in the companies’ boards of members.

    Design/methodology/approach – The authors provide a detailed sectorial analysis and a classification of board members by type (executive, proprietary, independent and other external). In the second part, the authors exploit the fact that since 2013, the stock-listed companies are legally obliged to respond to a series of questions on gender diversity issues in their annual reports. Using this requirement, the authors perform an analysis using text processing techniques. The authors find that “self-plagiarism” is common in the responses – i.e. they copy responses from previous years – as well as “plagiarism” – i.e. they copy responses from other companies in previous years.

    Findings – The insufficient progress in respect to the goals of the Law of Equality of 2007 (enacted by Spanish authorities) and the lack of interest that can be inferred from the companies’ responses included in their annual reports lead the authors to consider the necessity of changing the law on the corporate policies gender quotas in Spain.

    Originality/value – It is the first study that realizes this type of analysis for Spain.