Preference revelation with a limited number of indifference classes

• Autores: Jerry S. Kelly, Donald E. Campbell
• Localización: Spanish economic review, ISSN 1435-5469, Vol. 4, Nº 2, 2002, págs. 151-158
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Abstract. Suppose that g is a strategy-proof social choice rule on the domain of all profiles of complete and transitive binary relations that have exactly m indifference classes. If $m \ge 3$ and the range of g has three or more members, then g is dictatorial. If m = 2, then for any set X of feasible alternatives, there exist non-dictatorial and strategy-proof rules that are sensitive to the preferences of every individual and which have X as range.