La crítica absoluta y la nada absoluta: Una interpretación desde Kant, Hegel y Tanabe

• Autores: Sasha Jair Espinosa de Alba
• Localización: European Journal of Japanese Philosophy: EJJP, ISSN-e 2367-3095, Nº. 1, 2016, págs. 125-148
• Idioma: español
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• Resumen

  • For philosophy to criticize the concept of reality requires self-criticism. Throughout history many thinkers that have systematized a critique of both reality and philosophy. In this article we will analyze the Kantian and Hegelian systems by showing the failure in their respective critique to exercise sufficient self-criticism, resulting in unfinished critiques. Going a step further, Tanabe’s proposal was to plunge philosophy into a kind of «absolute disruption» that would drive thought beyond itself by means of an absolute critique in which being and nothingness are seen to interpenetrate each other, thus opening up the possibility of positing absolute nothingness as «a foundation that is not a foundation.»