Anticompetitive Financial Contracting: The Design of Financial Claims

• Autores: Lucy White, Giacinta Cestone
• Localización: The Journal of finance, ISSN 0022-1082, Vol. 58, Nº 5, 2003, págs. 2109-2142
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product-market channels. In existing models, a firm's choice of financial instruments deters entry by affecting product market behavior; here entry deterrence occurs by affecting the credit market behavior of investors towards entrant firms. We find that to deter entry, the claims held on incumbent firms should be sufficiently risky, that is, equity. This contrasts with the standard result that debt deters entry. This effect is more marked the less competitive the credit market is¿so more credit market competition spurs more product market competition.