Moore’s paradox and the logic of belief

• Autores: Andrés Páez Peñuela
• Localización: Manuscrito: revista internacional de filosofía, ISSN 0100-6045, Vol. 43, Nº. 2, 2020, págs. 1-15
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Abstract Moore’s Paradox is a test case for any formal theory of belief. In Knowledge and Belief, Hintikka developed a multimodal logic for statements that express sentences containing the epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. His account purports to offer an explanation of the paradox. In this paper I argue that Hintikka’s interpretation of one of the doxastic operators is philosophically problematic and leads to an unnecessarily strong logical system. I offer a weaker alternative that captures in a more accurate way our logical intuitions about the notion of belief without sacrificing the possibility of providing an explanation for problematic cases such as Moore’s Paradox.