Does Public News Decrease Information Asymmetries?: Evidence from the Weekly Petroleum Status Report
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Julio A. Crego [1]
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[1] Tilburg University
Tilburg University
Países Bajos
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- Localización: Documentos de Trabajo ( CEMFI ), Nº. 14 (CEMFI Working Paper No. 1714, November 2017), 2017
- Idioma: inglés
- Enlaces
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Resumen
I argue that the arrival of a public signal, regardless of its content, can yield an increase in adverse selection costs in financial markets. To explain its occurrence, I propose a dynamic model with a public signal and risk-averse informed investors. In this set-up, the public signal induces informed investors to participate in the market as it reduces uncertainty. While it increases adverse selection costs, the increase in participation results in more informative prices. Apart from the static effects, the model's dynamics deliver testable hypotheses about price and liquidity before and after the signal's release. Using transaction-level data, I estimate the effect of the release of the Weekly Petroleum Status Report on the bid-ask spread, volume, and midpoint returns via a difference-in-difference strategy. I find that the mean bid-ask spread doubles immediately after the release and that volume increases by 32 percent. Moreover, this effect persists over time, and is independent of the report's content whereas prices react to this information immediately. Nevertheless, liquidity at the end of the trading session is not affected by the report.
