Resumen de La atenuante de reparación del daño como instrumento de la justicia restaurativa en la delincuencia socioeconómica
- español
Debe saludarse como especialmente atinente la objetivación de la atenuante que tiene lugar con la aprobación del Código penal de 1995, por la que se destierra el requisito del arrepentimiento espontáneo, y se facilita su aplicación al reo, con independencia de cuál sean los motivos de su actuación. La contrapartida de esa objetivación radica en que la búsqueda a toda costa de la efectiva reparación del daño de la víctima podría provocar fricciones tanto con el ideal de la justicia restaurativa, como con los fines del Derecho penal.
- English
The revision of the criminal instruments in the light of the postulates of restorative justice places the mitigation of damage in a central position of the new model, in consideration of its direct connection with the satisfaction of the interests of the victim. From that point of view, the objective nature of the mitigating factor, which was introduced with the adoption of the 1995 Criminal Code, which abolishes the requirement of spontaneous repentance and facilitates its application to the offender, regardless of the reasons for his action, is particularly noteworthy. The same favourable judgment is merited by the extension of the temporary scope of application, which is brought forward to the beginning of the oral proceedings phase. The counterpart of this objectivity is that the search for effective reparation of the harm to the victim at all costs could cause friction with both the ideal of restorative justice and the aims of criminal law. Firstly, because it can lead to reparation without dialogue with the victim; secondly, because when reparation involves an insignificant effort for the perpetrator, either because it is paid for by a third party the insurance company, the co-defendant or the legal entity), or because its special economic power does not leave a mark, it can compromise the aims of general and special prevention. In these coordinates, the question is whether the current configuration admits improvements that maximise the reparative end without affecting the rest of the criminal law tasks, or whether the improvements must and can come from a revision of the interpretative criteria in order to free them from historical inertias without a legal basis at present, and adapt them to the demands of the new model of restorative justice. To answer this question, I start from the current configuration of reparation as a mitigating circumstance, of which its restorative possibilities can be optimised without having to propose it as a third way of responding to the offence, in the path of the strictest versions of the Premial Law ,whose intrinsic incompatibility with the essence of the law of sanctions Bricola warns about. The special seriousness of the socio-economic crimes dealt with here, as well as the danger that the greater economic capacity of their perpetrators will inhibit the intimidating effect expected from the reparative effort, lead me to rule out the complete replacement of the penalty by reparation as the first option
