The Audit Market Dynamics in a Mandatory Joint Audit Setting: The French Experience

• Autores: Lamya Kermiche, Charles Piot
• Localización: Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance, ISSN-e 2160-4061, ISSN 0148-558X, Vol. 33, Nº 4, 2018, págs. 463-484
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Policy makers in France have considered joint audits as a solution to mitigate the audit market concentration and the “systemic” risk associated with Big 4 auditors. We implement a Markovian analysis where audit clients chose between different types of combinations across Big 4 and smaller auditors. Our main findings support the view that the French joint audit system is effective in maintaining market openness and in mitigating the Big 4 domination in the long run. An investigation of the determinants driving changes in joint audit combinations suggests little economic support in favor of two Big 4 combinations, whereas changes in audit clients’ agency costs (e.g., higher ownership concentration) tend to explain the performance of mixed and two non-Big 4 combinations. Overall, this study supports the European Commission’s position on the potential benefits of joint audits in mitigating the market concentration; it also suggests that it might not be necessary to impose mixed joint audits to achieve that objective.