The morality of “ get-threats”: Withholding divorce as extortion
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Ram Rivlin [1]
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[1] Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Israel
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- Localización: International journal of constitutional law, ISSN 1474-2640, Vol. 18, Nº. 3, 2020, págs. 849-869
- Idioma: inglés
- Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
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Resumen
Threatening to withhold Jewish divorce in order to extract concessions, which I term here the “get-threat,” is widely regarded as extortionist. Yet this view is commonly associated with skepticism towards agreements stemming from unequal bargaining power, or with a progressive view of the proper divorce regime. Building on contemporary discussions of what is known as “the paradox of blackmail” this article argues that in many cases get-threats should be regarded as simple cases of extortion even by libertarians and conservatives. It then presents and analyzes the best possible statement of defense for the practice of get-threats, designed for the “reasonable reactionary,” showing that even from that point of view get-threats should be limited in scope and magnitude to a narrow range of cases of justified, reasonable demands. The article thus offers both a precise analysis of a longstanding debate and a normative argument for its proper resolution.
