En el presente trabajo, se realiza un examen de diversas manifestaciones del principio de preclusión que se aprecian en la fase de recursos del proceso civil. Sobre este particular, se analizan determinadas circunstancias que afectan al cómputo de los plazos establecidos en la LEC para el planteamiento de recursos, sea a la determinación del dies a quo, sea a la fijación del dies ad quem de dichos plazos. Al hilo de lo anterior, se abordan algunas cuestiones problemáticas y se plantean posibles interpretaciones que pudieran servir para poner fin a usos abusivos de ciertas facultades procesales que, amparados en la vaguedad de los términos legales, pretenden burlar el juego de la preclusión.
In this article the author examines the several meanings of the preclusion principle that applies at the stage of the civil process, where the party concerned should file an Application for leave to Appeal. In this sense, the author analyses some particular circumstances that affects the calculation of time periods laid down in the Civil Procedural Law Code in order to apply for leave to appeal, i.e., the determination of dies a quo or dies ad quem of the legally fixed time periods.
In addition, this article deals with some relating issues that causes concern, and considers different points of view that could serve as possible solutions, addressed to put an end to certain practices that can be seen as an abuse of some procedural rights that, provided under the vagueness of the Law, pretends to outwit the fair play of the preclusion.
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