México
La inestabilidad reciente del gabinete poltico de Mxico (1989-1999) obedece a mecanismos y causas estructurales. El anlisis longitudinal de datos permite concluir, en primer lugar, que la variable "sistema multipartidista competitivo" posee mayor poder explicativo que algunas variables econmicas (crecimiento del PIB, inflacin, existencia de un programa de ajuste econmico) asociadas tradicionalmente con la inestabilidad gubernamental o de gabinetes. En cuanto al mecanismo que genera inestabilidad, se puede establecer que consiste en la decisin calculada del Ejecutivo de utilizar activamente sus amplias facultades de remocin y niombramiento para cimentar coaliciones interpartidistas que le permitan tanto cumplir con su agenda legislativa como atenuar el "faccionalismo interpartidario" en el partido gobernante.
Recent inestability in the Mexican political cabinet (1989-1999) follows mechanisms and structural causes. Longitudinal data analusis leads to the conclusion that, in the first place, the variable "competitive multiparty system" shows greater explanatory power than some economic variables (GDP growth, inflation, existment of an adjustmenteconomic program) that have been traditionally associated to governmental and cabinet inestability, it can be stated that it consists in the Executive's ration decision to actively exercise his removal and appointment powers in order to forge inter-party coalitions. The latter enables him to advance his legislative agenda and to attenuate intraparty faccionalism in the incumbent party.
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