Vagueness and the problem of evil: a new reply to van inwagen

• Oliveira, Luis ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Houston

     University of Houston

     Estados Unidos

     
• Localización: Manuscrito: revista internacional de filosofía, ISSN 0100-6045, Vol. 44, Nº. 4, 2021 (Ejemplar dedicado a: out./dez.), págs. 49-82
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • One of the few points of agreement between most theists and non-theists working on the problem of evil is that the existence of a perfect God is incompatible with the existence of pointless evil. In a series of influential papers, however, Peter van Inwagen has argued that careful attention to the reasoning behind this claim reveals fatal difficulties related to the Sorites Paradox. In this paper, I explain van Inwagen’s appeal to sorites reasoning, distinguish between two different arguments in his work, and argue that they both commit the same so-far-unnoticed mistake.