The de jure objection against belief in miracles

• Autores: Gesiel da Silva
• Localización: Manuscrito: revista internacional de filosofía, ISSN 0100-6045, Vol. 44, Nº. 4, 2021 (Ejemplar dedicado a: out./dez.), págs. 434-452
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Alvin Plantinga (1993a, 1993b, 2000) argues that de jure objections to theism depend on de facto objections: in order to say that belief in God is not warranted, one should first assume that this belief is false. Assuming Plantinga’s epistemology and his de facto/de jure distinction, In this essay, I argue that to show that belief in miracles is not warranted, one must suppose that belief in miracles is always false. Therefore, a person who holds a skeptical position regarding miracles must choose either to find evidence that all of the supposed miracles are false, or admit that one is assuming an areligious commitment as a starting point.