Renegotiations of Privatization Agreement of Water Utilities: Anecdotal Evidence from European Union

• Katarina Zajc ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Ljubljana

     University of Ljubljana

     Eslovenia

     
• Localización: Water, Governance, and Crime Issues / Katja Eman (ed. lit.), Gorazd Mesko (ed. lit.), Lorenzo Segato (ed. lit.), Massimo Migliorini (ed. lit.), 2020, ISBN 9783030448004, págs. 221-237
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The chapter focuses on empirical evidence; especially rule of law, with special emphasis on water crimes, with respect to the efficiency of private sector privatization options (concession agreements or outright sales of water utilities) in transition economies. A one-sided prisoners dilemma model, developed and described in Privatization and water Infrastructure (Zajc, Privatization and water infrastructure. EST – ZTT, Editoriale Stampa Triestina, Trieste, 2004), was used, which predicted that in economies with high rule of law, ceteris paribus, privatization options do not mater, since both are efficient. When rule of law is absent or diminished, outright sales of water utilities are more efficient. The chapter focuses on gathering the 15 years’ worth of empirical evidence on rule of law and privatization options in water utilities and test the proposed hypothesis set in 2004.