Crown-Presidentialism

• Partlett, William ^[1]
  1. [1] Melbourne Law School
• Localización: International journal of constitutional law, ISSN 1474-2640, Vol. 20, Nº. 1, 2022, págs. 204-236
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This article will theorize a previously unidentified type of constitutional design that I call “crown-presidentialism.” Crown-presidential design combines constitutional powers exercised by elected presidents in both presidential and semi-presidential systems. First, as in presidentialism, crown-presidential constitutions grant the elected president final management power over the makeup of the executive-branch government. Second, as in a semi-presidentialism, crown-presidential constitutions afford the elected president guardian powers to control the legislative branch as well as important judicial, prosecutorial, and integrity institutions. This formal design has provided presidents an important tool for dominating both formal and informal politics while claiming fidelity to democratic constitutional design. Crown-presidentialism is therefore an important tool in the super-presidentialism of many new authoritarian regimes. This finding is a reminder of the importance of formal design rules in shaping political behavior—even in some forms of authoritarian governance.