On backwards causation

• Autores: Brian Garret
• Localización: Revista portuguesa de filosofía, ISSN 0870-5283, Vol. 77, Fasc. 4, 2021, págs. 1209-1212
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In our world we never observe an effect which is earlier than its cause. All of our experience is of future-directed (or perhaps simultaneous) causation. But many have thought that backwards causation is at least logically or metaphysically possible. Max Black (1956) famously argued against this thought. I think his argument fails, but it’s still instructive. The correct rejoinder to Black teaches us what backwards causation must be like in a world of free agents, and implies that we can never have reason to bring about past events (in a world with backwards causal chains).