“The Riddle does not exist”: On proposition 6.5 of the Tractatus logico-philosophicus

• Autores: Luigi Perissinotto
• Localización: Revista de filosofía Aurora, ISSN-e 2965-1565, ISSN 2965-1557, Vol. 34, Nº. 63, 2022 (Ejemplar dedicado a: WITTGENSTEIN - The Tractatus after 100 years), págs. 155-172
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The essay has as its main theme proposition 6.5 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus and, in particular, its second paragraph "The riddle does not exist". In the first section, the notion of riddle is compared with that of problem, emphasising, among other things, the great relevance that, for Wittgenstein, the distinction between problems of philosophy and problems of natural science has; in the second, an attempt is made to clarify the meaning that Wittgenstein assigns to the word “riddle”: a riddle would be a question “in the void”, without any “direction”, that is, so to speak, a question that does not know what it is asking. This means that, even if it presents itself as a question, the riddle is a non-question. The third section highlights how the denial that there is the enigma is complementary to the denial, so characteristic of the Tractatus, that there are a priori true thoughts or propositions.