Towards a Holistic View of Self-Deception in Kant’s Moral Psychology

• Maria Eugênia Zanchet ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Bayreuth

     University of Bayreuth

     Kreisfreie Stadt Bayreuth, Alemania

     
• Localización: Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy, ISSN-e 2386-7655, Nº. 16, 2022, págs. 194-219
• Idioma: español
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• Resumen

  • In his notable account of lying in the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant draws a parallel between self-deception and external lying, and argues that the agent who lies throws away her personality and dignity. Challenged by many commentators, this explanatory strategy may suggest that Kant's prohibition of deception would be motivated by a contentious teleological principle. In my account, I reject this suggestion and further show that this parallel can help us better understand the nature of self-deception. By borrowing elements from outside of Kant's treatment of self-deception in the Doctrine of Virtue, this paper aims to offer an account of Kant's strong condemnation of self-deception, while showing that what is at stake in cases of deception goes far beyond teleological principles. I contend that taking seriously the parallel between lying and self-deception is crucial for avoiding the trap of falling into teleological claims and that, in contrast to what some commentators suggest, the parallel is key to understanding self-deception.