When a person feels that she is guilty and believes that she is not guilty

• Autores: Juha Räikkä
• Localización: The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy / Ioanna Kuçuradi (ed. lit.), Stephen Voss (ed. lit.), Cemal Güzel (ed. lit.), Vol. 9, 2006 (Philosophical Anthropology), ISBN 975-7748-34-X, págs. 149-152
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Guilt feelings are an important part of our emotional life that is relevant to moral philosophy, and guilt feelings raise many theoretically interesting questions. One such question is the problem of how it is possible that sometimes people seem to feel guilty because of an act they have committed even if they believe that the act is not wrong and that it does not have any moral costs. A person raised in a religious family may have been taught that going to the theater is wrong, and even if she has rejected this taboo years ago, she may still feel guilty when attending theater. At least, this seems to be the case. If it is the case, then one must explain how it is possible that a person may feel guilty without believing that she is guilty, i.e. that (1) she is responsible for the act and that (2) the act is wrong or has moral costs. Suppose, however, that it is not possible to feel guilty while believing that one is not guilty. Then one must explain why it seems that sometimes—in taboo cases—one can feel that she is guilty and at the same time believe that she is not guilty. In this paper I evaluate some of the usual solutions to the problem and explicate their problems.