Resumen de Constraining constituent conventions: Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès and the limits of "pouvoir constituant"
Constituent power is widely viewed as the people’s legally unlimited power to make constitutions. This Popular Account of Constituent Power, as I call it, has been particularly influential in Latin American constitution-making processes, where it is often invoked as a justification for constituent conventions to ignore limits imposed on them. Although Carl Schmitt’s constitutional theory is a prominent source for the Popular Account, its proponents ultimately believe it to be based on Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès’s theory of pouvoir constituant. In this article, I show that this belief is unfounded. As I argue, Sieyès’s theory is best viewed as a secularized natural law theory that limits constituent power. Focusing on constituent conventions in particular, I demonstrate that Sieyès’s theory imposes two constraints on them: their mandate from the people and the common interest. I show the practical relevance of this finding by applying it to the current constitution-making process in Chile.
