Arnaldo Vergara Romero, Muman Rojas Dávila, Alex Olalla Hernández
Restricting policies on electoral spending are intended to equalize the conditions of participation of candidates for a seat in a popular election. However, does the application of these restrictions generate equity in the electoral contest, or the opposite? There is much evidence about the advantage of the candidate who is reelected (incumbent) against his contender (challenger), which questions whether the budget restriction on electoral spending is effective in itself. For this research, we used a multiple linear regression method that measures the effects of the effectiveness of campaign spending in attracting votes from candidates for mayor of Ecuador, resulting in incumbency providing a degree of advantage over challengers. much more than the efficiency of spending, all in a highly restrictive scenario in electoral budgets and political campaign time.
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