Stadtkreis Heidelberg, Alemania
This essay presents the basic philosophical position of hermeneutic realism, which mediates between realism and pragmatism. Namely, hermeneutic realism, on the one hand, as a realism, assumes the objectivity of what is the case, i.e. its independence from subjective beliefs about it, and, on the other hand, as a hermeneutic position, explains our perceptual cognition of things as our reading and translating them into elementary propositions. In this way, hermeneutic realism arrives, first, at an integrative concept of truth that has three essential aspects: correspondence (realist aspect), assertibility (pragmatic aspect) and unconcealment (phenomenal aspect).
Secondly, hermeneutic realism shows that subjects are necessarily corporeal and that as thinking corporeal beings they necessarily belong to the spatiotemporally real.
Thirdly, it mediates between Wittgenstein’s ontology of facts and Sellars’s ontology of objects by means of the thesis of the readability of things.
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