Meriti e demeriti dell'empirismo costruttivo di Bas van Fraassen
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Giorgio Rizzo [1]
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[1] University of Salento
University of Salento
Lecce, Italia
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- Localización: Giornale di Metafisica: revista bimestrale di filosofia, ISSN 0017-0372, Vol. 42, Nº. 2, 2020 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Risorse critiche dell’ermeneutica / coord. por Leonardo Samonà, Marco Moschini), págs. 460-473
- Idioma: italiano
- Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
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Resumen
Constructive empiricism affirms that science aims to give us theories that are empirically adequate, that is, coherent with the observable phenomena. Unlike scientific realism, according to which we should believe scientific theories when they give us good reason to think that they are true, constructive empiricism, as articulated and defended by Bas van Fraassen, proposes a broader scientific rationality and, in particular, refers to the obligations of being a scientific agent. Thanks to its epistemological modesty, constructive empiricism represents an effective response to scepticism, which puts into question the theoretical assumptions of scientific practice;
first of all, the idea that the success of a theory should involve its acceptance, truth and belief. In spite of its pragmatic gains, constructive empiricism has a naive approach to metaphysics that, while not being considered completely meaningless, is held to be a useless formal game.
