Quantificazione, predicazione e posizioni non-referenziali: una soluzione al regresso di Bradley

• Francesco F. Calemi ^[1]
  1. [1] Università di Perugia

     Università di Perugia

     Perusa, Italia

     
• Localización: Giornale di Metafisica: revista bimestrale di filosofia, ISSN 0017-0372, Vol. 42, Nº. 2, 2020 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Risorse critiche dell’ermeneutica / coord. por Leonardo Samonà, Marco Moschini), págs. 524-540
• Idioma: italiano
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • Bradleys’s famous regress argument against relations has some interesting implications for property realism: once properties are included into the ontological inventory, one should also give an account of the nature of the instantiation that binds a property to its bearer(s). In the present work I will present two versions of Bradley’s regress, that is the argument from copula’s reference and the argument from the principle of instantiation. I’ll put forward an overall platonic solution to both.