Argomenti aristotelici contro l’esistenza di un Essere per essenza

Enrico Berti ^[1]
1. [1] University of Padua
  
  University of Padua
  
  Padova, Italia
Localización: Giornale di Metafisica: revista bimestrale di filosofia, ISSN 0017-0372, Vol. 38, Nº. 1, 2016 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Dio come essere? / coord. por Giuseppe Nicolaci, Giovanni Ventimiglia), págs. 23-36
Idioma: italiano
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Resumen
- Aristotle argues against the possibility that being is the essence of anything in An. post. II 7, 92 b 13-14, a passage already quoted by Anscombe and Geach in Three Philosophers. In Metaph. III 4, 1001 a 4-b 1, Aristotle, discussing the thesis of Pythagoreans and Plato, refuses the existence of a Being, whose essence would be «Being itself» and «One itself», showing that it should have as a consequence the monism of Parmenides. The famous passage of Metaph. II 1, 993 b 23-31 (the causality of maximum), often used in favour of a maxime ens, has to be interpreted in a different way. Thomas Aquinas, when speaks of God as an esse ipsum, does not mean esse as existence, but refers to the esse of God.