L'indifferenza dell'essere tra l'Aristotele di Brentano e il sofista della fenomenologia husserliana
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Emanuele Mariani [1]
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[1] Universidade de Lisboa
Universidade de Lisboa
Socorro, Portugal
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- Localización: Giornale di Metafisica: revista bimestrale di filosofia, ISSN 0017-0372, Vol. 36, Nº. 2, 2014 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Metafisica in Jacques Derrida / coord. por Leonardo Samonà), págs. 471-490
- Idioma: italiano
- Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
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Resumen
Do semantics and ontology necessarily proceed hand in hand? Is saying something tantamount to saying a thing that is or that exists? In this question lies a problem into which Aristotle himself incurred. Against the principles of ontology stand the provocations of the Sophistic: even what does not exist can be said. This same tension will occur, after centuries, among Brentano and some of the major pupils of his School. Here then is our proposal: the track from metaphysics to psychology beaten by Brentano is intended to invest the logos with ontological roots, whereas the renowned epigones, and Husserl above all, will rather engage themselves in an enfranchisement of the semantic dimension. Against the Aristotelianism of the teacher, we would therefore have to expect a subtle, yet noteworthy, consequence: the phenomenological rehabilitation of the Sophist, when being and saying will not proceed any longer hand in hand.
