Notas sobre el "Wahrheitsbegriff", II
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[1] Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, Ciudad de México, México
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- Localización: Análisis Filosófico, ISSN 0326-1301, ISSN-e 1851-9636, Vol. 21, Nº. 2, 2001, págs. 149-185
- Idioma: español
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Resumen
This is the second part of a two-part paper devoted toa study of some historical, logical and philosophical issues arising from a reading of Tarski's celebrated "Wahrheitsbegriff' monograph. This second part concentrates on issues related to Tarski's "Wahrheitsbegriff' version of the theorem on the indefinability of truth. One of these issues is the correct exegesis of Tarski's claim that a truth definition cannot be constructed in a metalanguage if its order is not higher than that of the object language. Another issue is the correct contrast between Tarski's mathernatical achievement in offering his version of the indefinability result and Godel's achievement in his earlier discovery of another version of the result. The correct contrast must emphasize the fact that (contrary to frequent claims) Tarski's version does not use semantic notions (either defined or intuitive); no way towards a version of the indefinability theorem not employing intuitive semantic notions appears in Godel, despite thefact that he, like Tarski, sought to find non-semantic versions of his results.
