Autoengaño y responsabilidad moral: Un comentario sobre la suerte moral
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Vergara, Julia [1]
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[1] Universidad de Buenos Aires
Universidad de Buenos Aires
Argentina
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- Localización: Análisis Filosófico, ISSN 0326-1301, Vol. 21, Nº. 1, 2001, págs. 95-106
- Idioma: español
- Enlaces
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Resumen
B. Williams and T. Nagel's notion of Moral Luck set foth the following paradox. On the one hand (i) moral judgements have a restrictive condition (C): No one is morally responsible for things beyond his control. On the other (ii) an exhaustive analysis of the facts reveals that we never control anything. It follows, then, that if we were to accept the second claim moral judgements (under C) would be annuled, while If we choose the first one we would have to show how it is possible for the agent to control anything. To solve the paradox it must be shown either that one of the claims is false or that the inconsistency of the hole is only apparent. While in order to solve it Nagel suggest the second way this paper explores the possibility of consider that claim (ii) is false. The line of the argument centres on the issue of self-deception.
