En este trabajo me ocupo de la teoría substancialista del espacio y del tiempo y de sus consecuencias respecto del problema de la diferenciación de particulares indiscemibles, llamado a veces "problema de la individuación".Distingo dos variantes, la teoría "substancialista estándar" y la teoría "substratista", y concluyo que ninguna de las dos permite apelar a la diferencia de posición espacial o temporal para fundamentar la diversidad numérica de particulares indiscemibles, y en este sentido, ninguna permite utilizar al espacio y al tiempo como "principios de individuación".
In this paper l deal with the substantiva! theory of space and time and I examine its consequences with respect to the problem of the differentiation of indiscernible particulars (the so called "problem of individuation").
I distinguish two versions: the "standard" theory and the "substratist" theory.
According to the "standard" theory, space and time ( or spacetime) are substances made of points and instants (or point-instants) which hold a contingent relation with thephysical substances which occupy those points and instants.
According to the "substratist" theory, which may be attributed to D.M. Armstrong, space and time ( or spacetime) are also substances made of points and instants (or point-instants), but those points and instants hold a necessary relation with the physical objects which "occupy" them. This is so because those points (or point-instants) are, as substrata, essential constituents of physical objects, which support and hold togethertheir properties.I argue that in these theories we cannot appeal to the difference in spaciotemporal position in order to ground the numerical diversity of indiscernible particulars and, in this sense, they dont allow us to use space and time as "principies of individuation".
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