This paper is centered on the semantic theory of truth, fonnulated by Alfred Tarski. According to some authors, this theory is to be construed as a contemporary version of the traditional correspondence theory, namely, the one that defines truth as the correspondence between language and the world. In contrast, there are others vvho think that Tarki's theory reveals a deflationary conception oftruth, according to which truth can be reduced to a linguistic resource for semantic ascent. Since I agree with the last group, I set out to support a special version -the so-called ''semanticalist version"- of the deflationary interpretation of the semantic theory. In the first section, I characterize the two alternative conceptions of truth above mentioned, that is, correspondence and deflationism.The second section contains an exposition of the modal argumcnt, wich takes the Tarskian theory to inspire a syntacticalist version of the dcflationary conception. In the third section, l criticize the argument in question and attcmpt to ground the above mentioned wide, semanticalist interpretation of deflationism.
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