Resumen de Propositional Ignorance and False Propositions
In this paper I discuss the nature and structure of analysis of propositional ignorance. First, I will argue that unlike as at least two of the main conceptions of the epistemology of ignorance have assumed, the analysis of propositional ignorance is not reduced to the structure “S is ignorant that P” or similar variants of this structure. In reading propositional ignorance reduced in terms of "S is ignorant that P," these views do not make a good analysis of propositional ignorance. This is because, on the one hand, they generate a problem that refers to a possibility that has been little worked on. It is about the possibility of ignorance about false propositions and the problem, as will be shown, is that in this reduction there are good reasons both to affirm and to deny this possibility. This constitutes, at least, as a relevant theoretical tension that can compromise these conceptions and the analyzes carried out based on them. On the other hand, this reduction excludes at least a general and not necessarily factual sense of propositional ignorance, which deprives us of a more adequate analysis of ignorance and other related issues. Having this problem and its consequences in view, I will argue, secondly, for a hypothesis that has the potential to dissolve it by reformulating how we understand propositional ignorance, inheriting the advantages of reasons in favor and of reasons against the possibility of ignorance about false propositions and overcoming the objections raised against them.
