Legislative direction of regulatory bureaucracies: evidence from a semi-presidential system

• Benoît, Cyril ^[1] ; Szilagyi, Ana-Maria ^[2]
  1. [1] Centre d’études européennes et de politique comparée, Sciences Po, CNRS, Paris, France
  2. [2] Centre de recherches politiques, Sciences Po, Paris, France
• Localización: The Journal of legislative studies, ISSN 1357-2334, Vol. 29, Nº. 2, 2023, págs. 271-290
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Independent regulatory agency has become the standard institutional choice inWestern Europe. Little is known, however, about the involvement of legislatorsin their design and in their monitoring. In this paper, we analyse ex-ante and ex-post legislative involvement for 48 regulatory agencies enacted in France. Weshow that legislators debate and design more substantially agencies forwhich the government bill has already granted them more powers toappoint members to their board, or to be appointed as board membersthemselves. Once enacted, agencies that allow greater participation bylegislators in their decision-making are subject to greater scrutiny, and thiseven after controlling for routine oversight activities. Regulatory domainsmatter, though only for ex-post legislative oversight. These results suggestthat legislative involvement is selective and driven by strategicconsiderations. More fundamentally, they imply that legislative involvementcould be more important in regulatory agency activities than usually assume