Incentive-Driven Information Sharing in Leasing Based on a Consortium Blockchain and Evolutionary Game

• Hanlei Cheng ^[3] ; Jian Li ^[1] ; Jing Lu ^[2] ; Sio-Long Lo ^[3] ; Zhiyu Xiang ^[4]
  1. [1] Guangdong University of Technology

     Guangdong University of Technology

     China

     
  2. [2] Hubei University of Education

     Hubei University of Education

     China

     
  3. [3] Macau University of Science and Technology, China
  4. [4] Blockchain Laboratory, YGSoft Incorporation, China

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• Localización: Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research, ISSN-e 0718-1876, Vol. 18, Nº. 1, 2023, págs. 206-236
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Blockchain technology (BCT) provides a new way to mitigate the default risks of lease contracts resulting from the information asymmetry in leasing. The conceptual architecture of a consortium blockchain-based leasing platform (CBLP) is first proposed to facilitate information sharing between small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs, the “lessees”) and leasing firms (LFs, the “lessors”). Then, based on evolutionary game theory (EGT), this study builds a two-party game model and analyzes the influences of four types of factors (i.e., information sharing, credit, incentive–penalty, and risk) on SMEs’ contract compliance or default behaviors with/without blockchain empowerment. The primary findings of this study are as follows: (1) SMEs and LFs eventually evolve to implement the ideal “win–win” strategies of complying with the contract and adopting BCT. (2) The large residual value of the leased asset can tempt SMEs to conduct a default action of unauthorized asset disposal, while leading LFs to access the CBLP to utilize information shared on-chain. (3) When the maintenance service is outsourced instead of being provided by lessors, the maintenance fee is not a core determinant affecting the equilibrium state. (4) There is a critical value concerning the default penalty on-chain to incentivize the involved parties to keep their commitments. (5) The capability of utilizing information, storage overhead, and security risk should all be taken into consideration when deciding on the optimal strategies for SMEs and LFs. This study provides comprehensive insights for designing an incentive mechanism to encourage lessees and lessors to cooperatively construct a sustainable and trustworthy leasing environment.