Resumen de Exemplary Emotions: A Discussion of Normativity in Kant’s Aesthetic Judgment
In this chapter I will argue that the sentimentalist elements of Kant’s account call for a revision of its normative interpretations, a better framing of its subjective universalism, and finally for a reconsideration of aesthetic normativity in favour of regulativity.We will notably see that when reference is made to a wide notion of normativity a few non-negligeable problems arise: 1. Based on Kant’s aesthetic judgment, no value is attributed to an object, as it is rather a feeling that is expressed; the main question is: can a feeling be normative? 2. How is it possible to combine the regulative character, essential to Kant’s judgment of taste, with aesthetic normativity? Is it possible to speak about normativity without rules, norms and standards (normal ideas)? 3. Is it still possible to discuss normativity while entirely renouncing prescriptions? My chapter aims to discuss the normative character of aesthetic emotions in Kant’s third Critique by calling upon the notions of regulativity and exemplarity.
