Banking Union's accountability system in practice: A health check-up to Europe's financial heart
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Marco Lamandini [1] ; David Ramos Muñoz [2]
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[1] University of Bologna
University of Bologna
Bolonia, Italia
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[2] University Carlos III of Madrid
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- Localización: European Law Journal, ISSN-e 1468-0386, Vol. 28, Nº. 4-6, 2022, págs. 187-217
- Idioma: inglés
- Enlaces
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Resumen
The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) form theBanking Union, which comprises EU authorities (ECB and SRB) and national authorities (NCAsand NRAs) with vast powers. Although crucial for its legitimacy, the Banking Union’s accountabil-ity is flawed, and not for the (stereo)typical reasons: accountability is a visible concept in SSMand SRM regulations, and political, administrative and judicial bodies are knowledgeable, engagedand thorough. Rather, this article posits that the SSM and SRM work very well because the legis-lature focused on practical details such as information flows, planning and continuity and coordi-nation, while there has been no comparable effort to ensure the functioning of accountabilitytools. The result is a“system”characterised by limited access to crucial information, lack of conti-nuity, and uncoordinated functioning. Changing this should not be hard but requires replacingblanket criticism and stereotypical views with greater attention to detail.
