With the recent ruling Calvi and C.G. v. Italy, the ECtHR has added an important building block to its case law on measures depriving individuals with physical and mental disabilities of their legal capacity. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR in this area is essentially aimed at defining the negative obligations of States, and the limits within which the interference with the invoked ECHR rights can be considered legitimate. In this article we aim to analyze, with no pretense of exhaustiveness, this jurisprudence focusing on the concept of interference, by limiting the scope of our investigation to some substantive ECHR rights, namely the right to respect for private life, the right to a fair trial and the right to freedom.
Through this analysis it will be possible to understand the legal reasoning and the principles applied by the ECtHR to qualify a measure of deprivation of legal capacity as an unlawful interference.
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