Could robot judges believe? epistemic ambitions of the criminal trial as we approach the digital age. a comment on sarah summers «epistemic ambitions of the criminal trial: truth, proof, and rights»
- Autores: Sabine Gless
- Localización: Quaestio facti. Revista internacional sobre razonamiento probatorio, ISSN-e 2604-6202, Nº. 5, 2023, págs. 169-179
- Idioma: inglés
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Resumen
Criminal proof is unique, in that it must be able to account for the justification of both: accurate fact-finding and a fair trial. This is Sarah Summers’ main message in her article on the epistemic ambitions of the criminal trial, which focusses on belief as a sort of proxy for societal ac-ceptance of truth as a set of facts established by compliance to procedural rules. This commentary tests her finding by scrutinizing whether it is conceivable that robots, complying to all rules, assist in fact-finding with a specific form of legal belief based on a sophisticated probability weighting opaque to humans. The result is in accordance with Sarah Summers: as long as robots cannot explain their beliefs, any criminal proof based on them flounders as it can neither be part of a fair trial nor ensure acceptance in the existing institutional framework
