Las demostraciones de la existencia de Dios de Christian Wolff se encuentran principalmente en su Theologia naturalis. A pesar de que esta obra contiene en cada una de sus dos partes un argumento distinto, Wolff la llama “sistema de Teología natural”. Por ello, puede entenderse que las dos demostraciones no son totalmente independientes, sino que comparten una estructura argumental similar, aunque Wolff no lo mencione expresamente.
En este trabajo me propongo mostrar: 1) que aquello que las dos pruebas tienen en común es que ambas están basadas en la noción del ente que tiene en su esencia la razón de su existencia. 2) Que esta noción es el vínculo entre la perfección absoluta y la existencia necesaria. 3) Que la diferencia entre las dos pruebas consiste en que se desarrollan en direcciones opuestas, cada una presentándose como el reverso de la otra. Mientras que la primera parte de la existencia necesaria y concluye con la perfección absoluta, la segunda parte de la perfección absoluta y concluye con la existencia necesaria.
Christian Wolff’s arguments for the existence of God are mainly developed in his Theologia naturalis. Although this work presents a different argument in each of its two parts, Wolff calls it the “system of Natural theology”. This could be understood as suggesting that the arguments are not wholly independent one from another, but share a similar argumentative structure, even though Wolff does not say that explicitly.
In this paper, my purpose is to argue that: 1) what these two arguments have in common is that they are both based on the notion of the being which has the reason of its existence in its essence. 2) This very notion is the metaphysical link between maximal perfection and necessary existence. 3) The difference between these two arguments is that they are developed in opposite directions. While the first one starts from necessary existence and concludes with maximal perfection, the second one starts from maximal perfection and concludes with necessary existence.
In this paper, my purpose is to argue that: 1) what these two arguments have in common is that they are both based on the notion of the being which has the reason of its existence in its essence. 2) This very notion is the metaphysical link between maximal perfection and necessary existence. 3) The difference between these two arguments is that they are developed in opposite directions. While the first one starts from necessary existence and concludes with maximal perfection, the second one starts from maximal perfection and concludes with necessary existence.
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