Frente a la doctrina mayoritaria que considera que los robots —aun— con inteligencia artificial no son personas, ni merecen en un futuro ser personificados, al ser simples cosas, sometidas al dominio humano, el autor del presente trabajo, aun compartiendo la vigencia actual de aquella tesis, propone que en un futuro próximo la robótica pueda ostentar una personalidad fundacional, como medio, así, de resolver uno de los mayores problemas que la IA hoy plantea: el de la responsabilidad por los daños que ella misma causa.
Faced with the majority doctrine that considers that robots — even — with artificial intelligence are not people, nor do they deserve to be personified in the future, as they are simple things, subject to human domination, the author of this work, even sharing the current validity of That thesis proposes that in the future robotics can have a foundational personality, as a means, thus, of solving one of the biggest problems that AI poses today: that of responsibility for the damage it itself causes.
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