The Theory of Fundamental Rights and the Skinnerian Ethical System have quite different historical and theoretical origins, on the other hand, they have objectives that are similar: to plan deliberate interventions, guided by a set of values, with the purpose of producing certain consequences in society. The objective of this work is to demonstrate that these two fields of knowledge have a contextualist approach to values and that this contextualist view would be a starting point for the dialo-gue between them. This dialogue could enhance the discussions and scope of both areas and produce advances toward your goals. Fundamental rights had their origin in a natural law doctrine, in which there is the idea that natural rights exist, even if they are not expressed in legal norms. However, legal positivism doctrines of fundamental rights prevail today, which assume that only the norms that appear in the legal system are a right. It is the legal positivism doctrine that allows a contex-tualist analysis of fundamental rights because it conceives them as results of a dy-namic and complex process of collective struggles and achievements that come to be endorsed by the social and state order. In the Skinnerian Ethical System, values are understood as reinforcing consequences selected throughout the history of the species, individual and culture, and usually are different between individuals and societies, depending on the history of each one. Just like all behavioral phenome-non values arise from the interaction between organism and environment so that for Radical Behaviorism there are no absolute values in relation to what is ethical or unethical, since these criteria arise from contingencies. The Theory of Fundamen-tal Rights and the Skinnerian Ethical System defend different set of values, even though there may be similarities. However, in both cases, the values are understood as the result of social relations and historical events from a specific time. It means that the defense of certain values by a social group is always a result of concrete relationships based on a specific social context. The historical dimension of values leads to the flexible and open character of the set of values defended in either case, so, in both cases, their contents can suffer additions and alterations and are subject to social transformations. These points in common open up possibilities for dialo-gue between these fields of knowledge that can be very fruitful for achieving the objectives they propose. Futhermore, highlight the delicate problem of understan-ding values as historically determined and still taking them as guides for cultural planning, in the Skinnerian Ethical System, and public policies, in the Theory of Fundamental Rights
Apesar de terem origens históricas e teóricas bastante distintas, a Teoria dos Direi-tos Fundamentais e o Sistema Ético Skinneriano têm objetivos que se aproximam: planejar intervenções deliberadas, orientadas por um conjunto de valores, com a finalidade de produzir certas consequências na sociedade. O objetivo deste trabalho é demonstrar que estes dois campos de conhecimento têm uma abordagem contex-tualista dos valores e que essa visão contextualista seria um ponto de partida para o diálogo entre elas. Tanto na Teoria dos Direitos Fundamentais quanto no Sistema Ético Skinneriano os valores são compreendidos como frutos das relações sociais próprias de um povo e de um tempo histórico, de forma que a defesa de certos va-lores por um grupo social é sempre decorrente das relações concretas calcadas em um contexto social específico. A dimensão histórica dos valores conduz ao caráter flexível e aberto do conjunto de valores defendidos em um ou outro caso, já que seus conteúdos podem sofrer acréscimos e alterações e estão sujeitos às transfor-mações sociais. Estes pontos em comum abrem possibilidades de diálogos entre estes campos de conhecimento que podem ser bastante profícuos para o alcance dos objetivos a que propõem
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